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THESIS

**MAKING DECISIONS ABOUT U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY
RELATIONS:
TOWARD A LIMITED FORWARD-DEPLOYMENT IN THE
21ST CENTURY**

by

Daniel T. Evans

December 1998

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**MAKING DECISIONS ABOUT U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONS:
TOWARD A LIMITED FORWARD-DEPLOYMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY**

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

The end of the Cold War calls for new policies in Asia. To maintain stability and prosperity in the Asia Pacific region, the U.S. needs to restructure its forward-deployed presence. This restructuring will satisfy both domestic pressures and the security concerns of the countries in the region. The first part of this thesis will examine the relationship between Japan and the U.S. from the end of World War II through the end of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War and how this policy is developed within the United States. The next chapters will be devoted to the external factors that influence the U.S.-Japan alliance including waning public opinion in Japan for support of U.S. troops, the Asian economic crisis, and fears of Japanese militarism and of revived nationalism within Japan. This thesis will suggest ways to calm these fears including the continued development of regional security groups. Such measures represent a tremendous task, which, if accomplished, will allow for the reduction of the U.S. forces in the region without the creation of a power vacuum. This thesis argues in favor of a reduction that gives primacy to U.S. naval forces in the region, which could serve to satisfy the above concerns.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

One of the United States' major allies in the victory of capitalism over Soviet communism was Japan. The end of the Cold War marked a shift in the U.S.-Japan alliance, as both countries searched for ways to keep stability and prosperity in the region that is bogged down by remnants of the Cold War, as well as by significant mistrust between several of the countries of the region. This search continues as we approach the 21st century. Many analysts disagree about the role that U.S. and Japanese military forces should play in the Asia Pacific region in the new era. It is the goal of this thesis to assist the process of developing guidelines for the revised alliance between the U.S. and Japan and determine the roles and the shapes of the forces that will carry this alliance and regional stability into the next century. The United States, throughout the 1990s, has been reducing military spending while increasing the roles of the military in areas such as humanitarian assistance and operations other than war (OOTW). This trend can not continue. The United States military is already feeling the effects of being undermanned and overworked as retention and recruitment have both diminished in the post-Cold War years. One way to alleviate these accumulating pressures placed on the U.S. military is to reshape its forward-deployed presence. The forward-deployed troops in Asia represent such an opportunity.

This thesis will begin with an historical examination of the complementary aspects of the U.S.-Japan alliance. From the end of World War II through the end of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, the relationship between Japan and the U.S. was developed and

has evolved greatly. The culmination of this evolution, so far, came in the Clinton-Hashimoto summit of 1996. Through this summit, the countries developed the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security and conducted an extensive review of Japan's Defense Guidelines. The first chapter will chart this historical evolution and describe the guidelines from which the two countries now function to maintain stability and prosperity in the Asia Pacific region. With a definition of these guidelines as a foundation, the paper will then examine how this policy was developed within the U.S. government. This will include an analysis of congressional politics in the making of foreign policy. The tools for such an analysis will include the concepts of strategic myths and shaping of issues. Included in this analysis will be the influence of the so-called Nye Initiative on foreign policy toward Japan.

With the factors internal to the U.S. examined, the next chapter will be devoted to the external factors that influence the U.S.-Japan alliance. The first of these is the waning Japanese public support for the maintenance of U.S. troops in their country. This shift in public opinion is increasingly calling for a change in the status quo – a problem that will have to be dealt with by both countries if a successful alliance is to continue. Also, the current Asian economic crisis has been sufficiently felt in Japan. Japan currently pays five billion annually to maintain the U.S. troops stationed in Japan. This financial relationship may not be feasible for the Japanese in the future and will be addressed in this chapter.

It is not the point of this thesis to argue for the removal of all U.S. forces from Asia. Rather, it is to prove that a reshaping of the U.S. forward deployed troops can be

accomplished to alleviate pressures at home, while, at the same time, maintaining stability in the Asia Pacific region. Chapter V will argue that the Forward Deployed Naval Forces, namely Seventh Fleet, can accomplish the goals that forward deployment seeks to accomplish. Many of the other forces, such as a large number of ground troops, can serve their same purpose from the United States. Finally, this chapter will suggest an overall force structure that answers to all of the above concerns, domestically and internationally, and could serve to perpetuate stability in the region and the relationships between the region's countries and the U.S.

Chapter VI will analyze the external factors that affect the alliance and the roles of the two countries in the region that lie beyond the borders of Japan. The wars of the past have instilled a fear of the re-militarism of Japan, especially within Korea and China, both of which having been occupied by the Japanese in the past. This chapter will suggest ways to calm these fears including the continued development of regional security groups. The U.S. can enhance this development by encouraging transparency among all of the players and continuing to pursue diplomatic and economic relations with China, while, at the same time, developing greater roles for the militaries of these countries within the region. Such measures represent a tremendous task, but, to do so, will allow the reduction of the U.S. forces in the region without the creation of a power vacuum. Such a reduction is in tune with the downsizing initiatives that have been and will continue to be a prime factor in U.S. defense planning throughout the first half of the next century.

I. INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War marks a shift in United States (U.S.) foreign policy from stopping the spread of communism to engagement of the former adversary states and newly industrialized countries. Remnants of the Cold War remain, though, in Asia. The most obvious of these remnants is the divided Korean peninsula. Other remnants include the tensions between mainland China and Taiwan and remaining territorial disputes between Japan and Russia. The most troubling remnant, though, is the continued presence of 100,000 American troops in the Asia Pacific region. The removal or restructuring of these troops should become a priority of U.S. policy in the region. The U.S. troops are relics of the Cold War and the rationale for their presence has disappeared. The waning public opinion in both Japan and the U.S. for maintaining these troops in the region, the current Asian economic crisis, and the American desire to reduce defense expenditures also provide ample justification for restructuring the forward-stationed troops.

One of the United States' major allies in the victory of capitalism over Soviet communism was Japan. The end of the Cold War marked a shift in the U.S.-Japan alliance, as both countries searched for ways to keep stability and prosperity in the region that is bogged down by these remnants of the Cold War, as well as by significant mistrust between several of the countries of the region. This search continues as we approach the 21st century. Many analysts disagree about the role that U.S. and Japanese military forces should play in the Asia Pacific region in the new era. It is the goal of this thesis to assist the process of developing guidelines for the new alliance between the U.S. and Japan and

determine the roles and the shapes of the forces that will carry this alliance and regional stability into the next century. The United States, throughout the 1990s, has been reducing military spending while increasing the roles of the military in areas such as humanitarian assistance and operations other than war (OOTW). This trend can not continue. The United States military is already feeling the effects of being undermanned and overworked as retention and recruitment have both diminished in the post-Cold War years. One way to alleviate these accumulating pressures placed on the U.S. military is to reshape our forward-deployed presence. The forward-deployed troops in Asia represent such an opportunity.

The collapse of the Soviet Union transformed the international system substantially, but a corresponding shift in U.S. grand strategy has not followed. Christopher Layne called for a shift in this grand strategy from preponderance, which the U.S. practiced from 1945-1991 and still does, to a strategy of offshore balancing.¹ Offshore balancing would define U.S. interests in terms of defending the United States' territorial integrity and preventing the rise of a Eurasian hegemon. As an offshore balancer, the U.S. would disengage from its military commitments in Europe, Japan, and South Korea.² This thesis' proposal stops short of offshore balancing and suggests a strategy of power projection, or limited forward deployment, with U.S. Naval forces as the centerpiece. Preventing a Eurasian hegemon is not the goal of this power projection strategy, rather, it seeks to groom the potential Northeast Asian hegemonies, under Japan

¹ Layne, Christopher, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing, America's Future Grand Strategy," *International Security* Vol. 22, No.1 (Summer 1997), 86-124.

² Layne, 112.

and China, to become benign forms of hegemony. This strategy proposes a rational structure to meet the current security challenges, not a call for American isolationism, which is what some consider Layne's offshore balancing to be.

The U.S.-Japan security relationship has historically had economic implications. Japan's "free ride" from the U.S. enabled them to climb out of the ruins that World War II left them in. This relationship into the 21st century is no different. In the post-Cold War era, the U.S. is searching for ways to reduce defense expenditures. The U.S. strategy of preponderance is expensive and the U.S. needs to find ways to stretch its defense dollars. The Asian economic crisis is also affecting the U.S. role in the region. Both Japan and South Korea may find it difficult to continue to support American troops on their soil with generous Host Nation Support. Thus, the strategy of limited forward-deployment calls for restationing the majority of the ground and air troops from Japan and Korea to other American bastions in the Pacific, namely Hawaii and Guam.

The implementation of such a strategy of limited forward deployment would be met with several obstacles. Public support for the existing forward-deployed structure is waning, both in Japan and the U.S.. Public opinion in both countries is increasingly calling for a change in the status quo. While the pressures for change are significant, the pressures within the region to maintain the U.S. force structure may be even stronger. The U.S. presence, it is argued, has been the balancing factor ensuring peace and stability in the region. Many fear that if the U.S. changes its force composition in the region, then it would be perceived by the countries of the region that the U.S. is no longer committed to the security of the region. The withdrawal of U.S. troops supposedly would create a

power vacuum in the region, which would spur an arms race among the countries of the region to fill this vacuum. The result, it is argued, would be regional instability. Coupled with this possible arms race is the fear of the remilitarization of Japan by the other countries of the region. These historical confrontations make the restructuring of U.S. troops in Northeast Asia a complicated problem.

Many analysts argue that a diminished U.S. troop presence in East Asia would act as a centrifugal force pushing the countries of the region further away from each other, instigating arms races in the region and overall instability. This thesis will argue that reducing the U.S. presence can accomplish the opposite, acting as a centripetal force. This force can pull the countries of the region toward multilateralism in dealing with the security issues in the region, as well as alleviate the domestic pressures in both the U.S. and Japan that forward-stationing causes. Such an approach represents a libertarian, conservative alternative to the conventional analyses shared by mainstream analysts and military officials.

The methodology used in this thesis will be a case study of the evolution of the U.S.-Japan security relationship. This historical analysis will then be used to suggest ways to perpetuate the U.S.-Japan security relationship and maintain stability in the Asia Pacific region. This thesis will begin with an historical examination of the complementary aspects of the U.S.-Japan alliance. From the end of World War II through the end of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, the relationship between Japan and the U.S. was developed and has evolved greatly. The culmination of this evolution, so far, came in the Clinton-Hashimoto summit of 1996. Through this summit, the countries developed

the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security and conducted an extensive review of Japan's Defense Guidelines. The first chapter will chart this historical evolution and describe the guidelines from which the two countries now function to maintain stability and prosperity in the Asia Pacific region.

With a definition of these guidelines as a foundation, the paper will then examine how this policy was developed within the U.S. government. This will include an analysis of congressional politics in the making of foreign policy. The tools for such an analysis will include the concepts of strategic myths and shaping of issues. Included in this analysis will be the influence of the so-called Nye Initiative on foreign policy toward Japan.

With the factors internal to the U.S. examined, the next chapter will be devoted to the external factors that influence the U.S.-Japan alliance. The first of these is the waning Japanese public support for the maintenance of U.S. troops in their country. The Okinawan rape incident of 1995 and the "Sasebo slashing" of 1996, among other crimes by U.S. personnel stationed in Japan, have caused a drastic shift in Japanese public opinion. This shift in public opinion is increasingly calling for a change in the status quo – a problem that will have to be dealt with by both countries if a successful alliance is to continue. Also, the current Asian economic crisis has been sufficiently felt in Japan. Japan currently pays five billion annually to maintain the U.S. troops stationed in Japan. This financial relationship may not be feasible for the Japanese in the future and will be addressed in this chapter.

It is not the point of this thesis to argue for the removal of all U.S. forces from Asia. Rather, it is to prove that a reshaping of the U.S. forward deployed troops can be accomplished to alleviate pressures at home, while, at the same time, maintaining stability in the Asia Pacific region. Chapter V will argue that the Forward Deployed Naval Forces, namely Seventh Fleet, can accomplish the goals that forward deployment seeks to accomplish. Many of the other forces, such as a large number of ground troops, can serve their same purpose from the United States. Finally, this chapter will suggest an overall force structure that answers to all of the above concerns, domestically and internationally, and could serve to perpetuate stability in the region and the relationships between the region's countries and the U.S.

Chapter VI will analyze the external factors that affect the alliance and the roles of the two countries in the region that lie beyond the borders of Japan. The wars of the past have instilled a fear of the re-militarism of Japan, especially within Korea and China, both of which having been occupied by the Japanese in the past. This chapter will suggest ways to calm these fears including the continued development of regional security groups. The U.S. can enhance this development by encouraging transparency among all of the players and continuing to pursue diplomatic and economic relations with China, while, at the same time, developing greater roles for the militaries of these countries within the region. Such an analysis will include a plan for the Koreanization of Korean defense with regard to North Korea, and greater roles for the already well-established Japanese Self Defense Forces – all in collaboration with the People's Republic of China. Such measures represent a tremendous task, but, to do so, will allow

the reduction of the U.S. forces in the region without the creation of a power vacuum.

Such a reduction is in tune with the downsizing initiatives that have been and will continue to be a prime factor in U.S. defense planning throughout the first half of the next century.

II. EVOLUTION OF FORMAL U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

The end of the Cold War required a reassessment of U.S. foreign policy. With the great threat diminished, the relationship between the U.S. and foreign countries also had to change. Nowhere was this more evident than in the Asia Pacific region and the U.S. alliance with Japan. The Clinton-Hashimoto Summit of April 1996 marked an attempt by both Japan and the U.S., enemies just fifty three years ago, to collaborate in constructing the best strategy of defense for the Asia Pacific region. On paper, the “Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security – Alliance for the 21st Century”³ and the follow-on “Japan Defense Guidelines Review”⁴ look very promising in sketching out a new role for the military of Japan in maintaining peace and prosperity in the region. But history has shown that defense treaties between the U.S. and Japan have not always been binding. Japanese defense policy since the end of World War II has been the result of compromises between the desires of the U.S. and the inability of Japan to satisfy these desires. Japanese defense policy “on paper” is often much different than their defense policy “in practice” due to constitutional restraints on military action, Japanese public opinion, and the failure of Japanese politicians to manipulate either. To ensure security and prosperity into the 21st century for both countries, the U.S. needs to ensure that Japan follows up on its stated desires at the Clinton-Hashimoto Summit to become a collaborative security partner of the U.S. in the Asia Pacific region. One way that the

³ Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security – Alliance for the 21st Century.
[<http://club.jpn.net/infomofa/ju/security/security.html>].

⁴ U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, “Completion of the Review of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.”
[<http://www.usia.gov/regional/ea/easec/sccguide.htm>].

U.S. can ensure that Japan fulfills a role in the region more in line with her capabilities is to reduce the size and structure of forward deployed American troops in the region. The revised alliance represents a means for Washington to devolve the U.S. global policeman role to a regional power that can assume burdens, costs, and responsibilities that Americans no longer want to bear to the Cold War extent.⁵ To understand how the U.S.-Japan relationship got where it is today, it proves beneficial to look at how it has developed since the end of World War II.

A. YOSHIDA DOCTRINE

The key figure in shaping the postwar conception of Japanese national purpose was Yoshida Shigeru, who was Prime Minister for seven years of the early postwar period. The cold war changed American policy toward Japan drastically. As the Soviet threat increased, the United States developed a need for an integrated defense strategy in the region; a defense strategy to include Japan, steering them away from neutrality and toward the side of the United States in the bipolar world. Japan negotiated its initial mutual security arrangements with the United States at the end of the occupation while still giving primacy to economic growth under what became known as the Yoshida Doctrine.

Foreign observers ordinarily understood Japan's political passivity as a result of popular consent and the restraints imposed on it by its 1946 constitution. This, in part, was true. Japanese society had developed a resentment of war and the military in general. But Yoshida used the restraints of Article 9 of the constitution to his advantage

⁵ Olsen, Edward A., "Liberal U.S. Motives Have Conservative Results in Security Pact; Larger Role for Japan Means Gradual Shift of Regional Burden," *The Nikkei Weekly*, August 19, 1996, 7.

to avoid involvement in international political-strategic issues and concentrate exclusively on economic rehabilitation. Article 9, as finally adopted reads:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

It was the intent of the constitution drafters to prevent Japan from ever again developing a war machine such as the one that endangered world security in World War II. But when the international scene changed, and America developed a need for Japan as an ally, the Japanese used the constitution to their advantage to steer clear of binding security arrangements. The contention that the constitution constrained the establishment of self-defense forces or participation in the United Nations or other multilateral security arrangements was devised by Japanese politicians for subsequent political purposes.⁶ Yoshida made this point clear when he told a future prime minister, Miyazawa Kiichi, at the time that:

The day [for rearmament] will come naturally when our livelihood recovers. It may sound devious, but let the Americans handle [our security] until then. It is indeed our Heaven-bestowed good fortune that the Constitution bans arms. If the Americans complain, the Constitution gives us a perfect justification. The politicians who want to amend it are fools.⁷

⁶ Pyle, Kenneth B., *The Japanese Question* (Washington D.C.: AEI Press, 1992), 10.

⁷ Tetsuya Kataoka, *The Price of a Constitution: The Origin of Japan's Postwar Politics* (Crane Russak Co., 1991).

Whatever the virtue of Article 9 may have been when the United States pressed Japanese political leaders to adopt it after World War II, the article is now an obstacle to a worthwhile and equitable U.S.-Japanese relationship.⁸

B. THE COLD WAR YEARS

The cold war made Japan strategically important for the United States. This gave the Japanese, and Yoshida, leverage. The United States could benefit from an industrially strong Japan and Japan's geographic position was key to the deterrence of Communist aggression. It was under these auspices that Yoshida negotiated Japan's future. The cold war structure of international politics enabled Japan to regain its independence and shaped the Mutual Security Treaty that was eventually enacted in 1952. Under the Mutual Security Treaty, Japan was given a long term guarantee of its security by the United States in exchange for the establishment of American military bases in Japan and the establishment of what eventually became the Japanese Self Defense Forces. This arrangement was what later to be coined as Japan's "free ride."⁹ Japan gained national security under America's "nuclear umbrella" while making no guarantee as to commitment of forces for United States' defense. The low military spending required for Japan's Self Defense Forces turned out to be a key factor in Japan's economic advance. These negotiations proved to serve Japan for the next several decades and prompted former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to declare in his memoirs that,

⁸ Carpenter, Ted Galen, "Pacific Fraud: The New U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines," CATO Daily Commentary, October 16, 1997.

⁹ Fairbank, John K., Reischauer, Edwin O., and Craig, Albert M., *East Asia: Tradition and Transformation* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), 826.

“Japanese decisions have been the most far-sighted and intelligent of any major nation of the postwar era.”¹⁰

Thus, by 1952, the U.S.-Japan security relationship and the scope of Japanese defense policy were becoming clear. Two years later, the U.S. and Japan signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement that formally acknowledged Japan’s commitment to limited rearmament. The agreement stated that “Japan will make, consistent with the political and economic stability of Japan, the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities, and general economic conditions to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world, and take all reasonable measures which may be needed to develop its defense capacities.”¹¹

This agreement opened the door for the official and legal establishment of the Japanese Self Defense Forces. The Self Defense Forces Laws and the Defense Agency Establishment Law were passed in mid-1954 and marked the official rebirth of the Japanese military. Although the U.S. at this time was looking to develop an ally with a formidable military to combat communist aggression in the region and take a larger role in regional security, what actually came from the establishment of the Self Defense Forces was nothing more than a national police force. In reality, the Japanese Defense Forces existed on two levels. Militarily, they existed primarily to protect against the

¹⁰ Kissinger, Henry, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 324.

¹¹ U.S. Department of State, “Mutual Defense Assistance,” March 8, 1954, TIAS No. 2957, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, 669.

internal communist threat. Diplomatically, their establishment was a compromise accepted by the Japanese to gain the explicit U.S. security guarantee that Japan wanted. The laws did authorize Japanese force levels that would make it an attractive partner in a more comprehensive security arrangement with the U.S., but, at that time, they had not developed those forces.¹²

In 1957, Japan defined her defense policy under the Basic Policy for National Defense. The tenets of which are as follows:

The objective of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression, but once invaded, to repel such action, thereby preserving the independence and peace of Japan founded upon democratic principles.

To achieve this objective, the government of Japan hereby establishes the following principles:

1. To support the activities of the United Nations and promote international cooperation, thereby contributing to the realization of world peace;
2. To promote public welfare and enhance the people's love for the country, thereby establishing the sound basis essential to Japan's security;
3. To develop progressively the effective defense capabilities necessary for self defense, with regard to the nation's resources and the prevailing domestic situation.
4. To deal with external aggression on the basis of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements, pending the effective functioning of the United Nations in the future in deterring and repelling such aggression.¹³

The Basic Defense Policy justified the gradual build up of the Japanese Self Defense Forces throughout the 1950s, although primacy was given to the economic development of the country and defense spending was limited to one percent of the Gross National Product (GNP).

¹² Weinstein, M. E., "The Evolution of the Japan Self Defense Forces," in *The Modern Japanese Military System*, ed. James H. Buck, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975), 45.

¹³ Japanese Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1992*, 65 (translated into English by Japan Times Ltd.).

The existing alliance had not proved completely satisfactory to either partner, thus it was revised in the form of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the U.S. in January of 1960. This treaty served to replace the Mutual Security Treaty of 1952 and still remains the working document of the Japanese Defense Agency. With the Self Defense Forces fully established by 1960, this treaty defined the possibilities of their use in support of U.S. and U.N. initiatives. Article I of the treaty states that both countries will “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”¹⁴ The treaty marks a pledge of support by Japan to the U.N., although their forces have rarely been used for such purposes, and when they have, they have been used in insignificant manners. Other articles of importance are Article III, which states that “the parties will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack,” and Article V which states that “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.”¹⁵ Inherent in both articles are the limits placed on Japan by its Constitution, as Article 9 strictly prohibits them from the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. This remains a point of contention today in Japanese security policy. Also noticeable in the

¹⁴ Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America. [http://club.jpn.net/infomofa/ju/q_a/sec/ref_01.html].

¹⁵ Treaty of Mutual Cooperation.

Treaty is the fact that the reciprocity of action only applies in Japanese territories, the treaty makes no provisions for Japan aiding the U.S. in defense of the United States or other U.S. interests. Also of relevance in the Treaty is Article VI, which grants the U.S. military the use of Japanese facilities to “contribute to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East.”¹⁶

These are the tenets of the U.S.-Japan alliance with which both countries carried into the 1990s. The world order has changed since the creation of the above treaties, and many American and Japanese analysts alike feel that the alliance needs to be revamped to match the existing world structure. The collapse of the Soviet empire, the normalization of U.S.-China relations under President Carter, and the rapid and complete economic successes of Japan have changed the needs and capabilities of both countries. The bilateral agreements between the U.S. and Japan need to reflect these changes.

C. U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY INTO THE 21ST CENTURY

President Clinton and former Prime Minister Hashimoto met in an April 1996 summit in an attempt to redefine the relationship between the countries and their security alliance. The results of that summit have been the topic of many arguments among analysts who disagree on the role that the U.S. and Japanese forces, respectively, should play in the Asia region. Some analysts feel that the U.S. needs to remain engaged in the region and keep its troops forward deployed because if they are removed, it would create a dangerous power vacuum in Asia, which could spur an arms race among Asian

¹⁶ Treaty of Mutual Cooperation.

countries.¹⁷ Other analysts feel that the proper U.S. role in the region is solely to keep sea-lanes open and project American power through the use of naval forces.¹⁸ The summit provided valuable dialogue between the two countries, but did not commit Japan “hard and fast” to any specific action. This is a position that Japan has been in before – if they had promised specific action, then they would be setting themselves up for failure, thus deteriorating their relationship with the U.S., if they failed to come through on their promised actions. Therefore, what they did promise at the summit was to discuss and consider the greater commitments that the U.S. desired for them. For this alliance to be of continued significance into the next century, the U.S. must convince Japan to commit to specific action.

The summit resulted in both countries agreeing that greater bilateral cooperation will be necessary in the future between the U.S. and Japan in dealing with the uncertainties of the region.

The President and the Prime Minister agreed that the most effective framework for the defense of Japan is close defense cooperation between the two countries. This cooperation is based on a combination of appropriate defense capabilities for the Self Defense Forces of Japan and the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. The leaders again confirmed that U.S. deterrence under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (of 1960) remains the guarantee for Japan’s security.¹⁹

¹⁷ This is the widely believed view expressed by former Commander of the Marine Corps in Japan, Major General Henry Stackpole, who stated bluntly that “If we were to pull out of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, it would definitely be a destabilizing factor in Asia.” Also expressed by President Reagan’s first National Security Adviser, Richard Allen, who stated that “If the U.S. disengages, or is seen to be disengaging, albeit slowly, from Asia... the effect may be either that of a vacuum to be filled or a simple lateral replacement of one influence by another. I cannot see how this will benefit U.S. interests.” Both quoted in Ted Galen Carpenter, “Paternalism and Dependence: The U.S.-Japanese Security Relationship,” CATO Policy Analysis No. 244, November 1, 1995. Also see comments by Michael Green in “Panelists Discuss Japan’s Future in Asia and the World,” *Mainichi Daily News*, December 17, 1996, 11.

¹⁸ Expressed by Japan specialist Chalmers Johnson in Michael Lev, “U.S. Bases Fill Need in Asia,” *Chicago Tribune*, March 29, 1996, 1.

¹⁹ Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security – Alliance for the 21st Century. [<http://club.jpn.net/infomofa/ju/security/security.html>].

As a result of this renewed cooperation agreed upon at the summit, the governments of both nations completed a Defense Guidelines Review (DGR) released in September 1997.²⁰ This review suggested a much larger role for the Japanese military in promoting and preserving regional stability. The new self defense roles proposed in the DGR report cover the following areas: participating in refugee relief and transfer operations; helping the U.S. enforce naval blockades; inspecting foreign ships to enforce sanctions; conducting search and rescue operations on the high seas; providing material (except weapons and ammunition) and fuel to U.S. vessels and aircraft; permitting the use of Japanese airfields by U.S. warplanes involved in conflict; engaging in enhanced intelligence gathering and sharing; and providing other rear area support such as maintenance, medical services, security, and communications.²¹ These guidelines provide an ample framework for the Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) to work with, but the implementation of these guidelines in practice may prove difficult for the Japanese government. As has been the case since the end of World War II, the Japanese constitution, namely Article IX, may inhibit the greater role that the U.S. is seeking for Japan. Also, Japanese public opinion does not favor an increased role for the military in the region. The Japanese public is quite content with the “solely defense” role the JSDF has played since its creation. Both of these reasons, coupled with the pragmatist approach of Japan’s current political leaders, do not indicate that significant changes will occur in the roles of the JSDF. The pragmatist approach of Hashimoto, current Prime

²⁰ This was a review and update of the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.

²¹ National Security Planning Associates, “Asia Pacific, Issues and Developments,” (Cambridge, MA: November 1997), V.

Minister Obuchi, and other Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leaders involves trying to steer clear of divisive debates over security and the constitution. These leaders are sensitive to political winds and will adapt to prevailing public opinion.²²

The President and former Prime Minister also agreed that a continued U.S. military presence is essential for preserving peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. reaffirmed that meeting its commitments in the prevailing security environment requires the maintenance of its current force structure of about 100,000 forward-deployed military personnel in the region, including about the current level in Japan.²³ These two agreements are contradictory. On one hand, the U.S. is pushing for greater Japanese involvement in regional security, while, on the other, maintaining the over abundance of U.S. troops in the region. The results of this dichotomy, thus far, are stagnancy. The asymmetrical nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance has not been altered in any fundamental way by the agreements signed at the summit, despite comments in the Japanese and American press hailing the results as “historic,” “far-reaching,” and “a landmark moment.”²⁴

What was adopted at the summit was heavily influenced by a report put forward by a former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Joseph Nye, known as the Nye Initiative.²⁵ The Nye Initiative proffers that 100,000 troops are needed in the region for the following reasons:

²² National Security Planning Associates, 4.

²³ Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security.

²⁴ Carpenter, Ted Galen, “Smoke and Mirrors: The Clinton-Hashimoto Summit,” CATO Foreign Policy Briefing No. 41, May 16, 1996.

²⁵ The document commonly referred to as the “Nye Initiative” or “Nye Report” is a publication put out by Nye’s office at the time, the Department of Defense Office of International Security Affairs, entitled “United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region” in February 1995.

- 1) The clear and present danger posed by North Korea.
- 2) To deter military expansion by the People's Republic of China (PRC).
- 3) To protect against a situation where countries in the region might feel pushed to arm themselves against each other and against uncertainty.
- 4) To keep Asian economic markets open.²⁶

These reasons for the retention of the current level of troops are perpetuated in U.S.

policy making toward Japan. It will be argued in later chapters that these reasons are, in fact, "strategic myths." These "myths" serve as justification for the U.S. to remain in a Cold War posture years after the end of the Cold War. The fact that these stated reasons for a continued American presence in the Asia Pacific region at such high levels are debatable has lead analysts to search for other possible reasons.

Japan specialist Chalmers Johnson has argued that the U.S. troops remain deployed in the region and in Japan especially, to be watchdogs. The real, but seldom stated, reasons (for a continued presence) are a desire on the part of the American government to keep an eye on Japan, thus preventing Japan from undertaking international initiatives without consulting Washington, and reassuring the rest of Asia that Japan will not rearm on its own.²⁷ Such a display of mistrust between the U.S. and Japan can only be harmful to the proposed alliance for the next century. In the new world order, Japan must be given regional responsibilities commensurate with her capabilities, and the U.S. must trust Japan in fulfilling these responsibilities.

The Joint Declaration of Security states that implementation of desired policies should be conducted with close coordination between the U.S., Japan, and China, as to

²⁶ Johnson, Chalmers, "The Okinawan Rape Incident and the End of the Cold War in Asia," Japan Policy Research Institute Working Paper No. 16, February 16, 1996, 4-5.

²⁷ Johnson, Chalmers, "The Okinawan Rape Incident and the End of the Cold War in Asia," 6.

not alienate China and to alleviate their fears of Japanese militarism. To take this a step further, perhaps the most effective arrangement in the region would be the development of a collective security agreement, coupled with bilateral relationships, among all of the nations of Northeast Asia. A Northeast Asia Treaty Organization (NEATO) would include Japan, China, North and South Korea, Russia, Mongolia, and perhaps the U.S. as a mediator, and serve to quell the concerns of the other nations over Japan's expanded military role in maintaining the security of the region. Such an organization would give each of the countries a forum from which to express their concerns on a level playing field and make the transition into the next century smoother. In fact, attempts at the organization of such groups have occurred²⁸, and some such groups do exist at a "track two" level.²⁹ The U.S. should continue to encourage such initiatives.

The Clinton-Hashimoto Summit represented a refreshing attempt by the two countries to move beyond cold war politics. The resulting Joint Declaration and Defense Guidelines have laid out the responsibilities for both nations in maintaining the peace and prosperity of the Asia Pacific region. The real test now comes in the implementation of these policies. The Japanese must overcome their historically embedded obstacles to increasing their military role in maintaining regional security, including, if deemed necessary, constitutional reform. The U.S. must ensure that Japan is held accountable for the implementation of these collaborative policies. And both countries must ensure that this transition is completed without alienating the other countries of the region. If history

²⁸ South Korea has proposed a Northeast Asia Security Dialogue (NEASED) composed of South and North Korea, the U.S., Japan, China, and Russia. NEASED has yet to be launched because North Korea rejects the idea.

²⁹ The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asian Pacific (CSCAP) represent two such groups.

provides any lessons, one is that economic power – for example, the U.S. after 1919 – cannot long evade the political and military responsibilities that follow.³⁰ Japan is such an economic power today and must assume the responsibilities of one.

³⁰ Mansbach, Richard W., “Changes in the Security Order of Northeast Asia and North-South Korea Relations,” *National Development Strategies Toward the 21st Century and Choices for Korea* (Kyungnam University: National Development Institute and the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, 1993), 20.

III. MAKING OF U.S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD JAPAN

Prior to the signing of this agreement, a two-year long intensive review of the political and security environment in the region was conducted by the governments of both countries. The results of the summit can be attributed to this review which involved, on the U.S. side, a combination of Congressional politics, bureaucratic influence, and executive action.

It is the roles of these players in the making of U.S. foreign policy toward Japan that are to be examined in this chapter. Namely, this chapter will analyze the ways in which Congressional decision-making is influenced by both inside and outside forces in the formulation of foreign policy and whether the best policy, in the case of Japan, has been achieved by these processes.

A. CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS AND BUREAUCRATIC INFLUENCES

Congressional decision-making on foreign policy is traditionally explained by simple causal factors that fall under an electoral explanation. The electoral explanation dictates that the things that motivate Congress members are the opinions of their constituency and their desire for reelection. The electoral explanation of congressional behavior can be broken into three sub-categories: extensive deference to the executive administration, grandstanding, and specific attention to parochial matters.³¹ Deference to the administration most likely occurs on foreign policy issues that are not of great importance or relevance to the general public. Thus, the members of Congress can do no

³¹ Lindsay, James M., *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 34-38.

better than to defer such policy decisions to the executive branch of an administration. Grandstanding has developed in the modern age of media where politicians can gain significant exposure in the press and on television by standing up for a particular cause in foreign policy. Such exposure can prove beneficial to a politician's electoral aspirations. Parochial concerns can influence Congressional decision-making when certain foreign policies have a direct impact on the constituency of a politician. Such would be the case if the constituency contains certain defense industries or contractors whose production would be affected by foreign policy decisions. A combination of all three of these sub-categories seems to have played a role, and continues to play a role, in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy toward Japan.

This relatively simple electoral explanation of Congressional decision-making is not sufficient to explain Congressional behavior though.³² A Congress member's specific ideologies and desire for "good policy and politics" also come into play in the making of foreign policy. Also important is how the process of framing political issues influences Congressional behavior. Framing constitutes a strategy through which key political and bureaucratic elites attempt to convince the public and fellow elites of the validity of their beliefs and supporting policy imperatives.³³ Congressional attitudes are invariably influenced by a combination of the electoral explanation and the members' desires for formulation of good policy and politics. But the process that ties these variables together is framing. In the formulation of a foreign policy toward Japan leading to the Joint

³² Lindsay, *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy*, 38-44.

³³ Ripley, Randal B. and Lindsay, James M., "How Congress Influences Foreign and Defense Policy," in *Congress Resurgent* eds. Randal B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), 32-35.

Declaration on Security, the framing of issues and development of certain strategic beliefs and images played a substantial role.

1. Framing of the Issues

The Nye Initiative heavily influenced what was adopted at the Clinton-Hashimoto Summit. The Nye Initiative proffers that 100,000 troops are needed in the Asia-Pacific region to counter what has been labeled here as “strategic myths.” Whether the threats of these “strategic myths” (North Korea, China’s military expansion, economic markets closing, or an arms race among the region’s nations if U.S. troops are removed) are correct or exaggerated is arguable. U.S. policymakers are compelled to overstate the dangers to American interests to mobilize domestic support for their policies.³⁴ But, regardless of the validity of these threats, these are some of the images and beliefs upon which the Japan-U.S. security alliance is framed. These images and beliefs perpetuate the desires of decision-makers to maintain the current force structure in Asia. Several political elites unwaveringly accept and disseminate these views in Congressional testimonies. Examples include Department of State Official Winston Lord, who stated that “it would be a serious mistake to touch our troop levels,” and Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific Chairman Doug Bereuter who has stated that “we are not going to cut back our capability.”³⁵

Framing takes place in several ways, from published articles to influence the general public to testimonies during Congressional hearings of the House Committee on

³⁴ Johnson, Robert H., *Improbable Dangers: U.S. Conceptions of Threat in the Cold War and After* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 131-132.

³⁵ Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, “US-Japan Relations and American Interests in Asia,” One Hundred Fourth Congress, First Session, October 25, 1995, 18.

International Relations and its various Sub-Committees. These testimonies have lasting impacts on the Committee members and define the boundaries of the issues being discussed. As Congressman Howard Berman, also on the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, stated to Nye during a hearing,

As a new member of this subcommittee back in January when you came to the subcommittee, it was very helpful to me in getting a sense of what the discussion was and what issues were involved in terms of security arrangements and forward basing and the whole U.S.-Japan relationship.³⁶

In other words, Berman's views on the issues of U.S.-Japan security were shaped substantially by Nye's perspectives.

Another example of framing the issues is testimony by Nye himself to the House Committee on International Relations, where he testifies that

Critics who ignore the importance of security in the (Asia-Pacific) region are like people who forget the importance of the oxygen they breathe. You tend not to notice it until you begin to lose it. But once you begin to lose it, there is nothing else you will think about.³⁷

It is through such means that political elites can shape issues in Congress and conjure powerful images to influence the foreign policy decisions of the U.S. government. The image of North Korea steamrolling over the 38th parallel or China's "red scare" are some of the images upon which national security policy is developed. Nye's image equating U.S. presence in the region to the oxygen we breathe was a lasting image that undoubtedly had some effect on the policies that were chosen in the Asia-Pacific

³⁶ Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, "US-Japan Relations and American Interests in Asia," One Hundred Fourth Congress, First Session, October 25, 1995, 14.

³⁷ Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, "The Future of U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia and the Pacific," One Hundred Fourth Congress, First Session, June 27, 1995, 132.

region.³⁸ But are these images accurate or are they simply “strategic myths” used to justify existing policy and the sustenance of forward-deployed troops for perhaps other, more tangible, reasons?

2. The Myths

a. The DPRK Danger

Although the Korean peninsula is extremely unstable, the threats to regional security posed by the North Koreans may not be as vast as perceived in Congressional testimony. South Korea (ROK) currently has a 650,000 man army of its own that can handle most threats from the North and the DPRK is an isolated and failing communist country on the brink of starvation that would probably not be able to sustain any prolonged conflict. In June 1994, well before the Nye report, the Japanese military analyst Shunji Taoka concluded that the DPRK was producing only sixty percent of the grain it needed and that there was a high probability it would collapse within three to five years.³⁹ The 37,000 U.S. troops stationed in Korea and the majority of U.S. troops in Japan (mainly those in Okinawa) are targeted against this diminishing threat. It can also be argued that the sheer numbers of North Korean troops on or near the border would be very difficult to stop initially. If Pyongyang chooses to act irrationally by launching a desperate attack, no amount of military power can deter it.⁴⁰ That being the case, the relatively limited 37,000 U.S. troops in Korea, whose stated purpose is to deter such

³⁸ Christopher Layne makes a counter-argument in “From Preponderance to Off-Shore Balancing” that the U.S. presence in Asia is more like carbon monoxide: it is not noticeable until it kills. That is to say, the maintenance of the status quo of U.S. presence in Asia is a potentially dangerous arrangement.

³⁹ Johnson, “The Okinawan Rape Incident and the End of the Cold War in East Asia,” 6.

⁴⁰ Hosokawa, Morihiro, “Are U.S. Troops in Japan Needed? Reforming the Alliance,” *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 1998), 3.

action by the North Koreans, would serve as nothing but a speed bump for the North Korean troops until U.S. and Korean reinforcements could arrive on station. Deterrence assumes reasonable judgment by the enemy.⁴¹ Reasonable judgment by the North Korean regime is not something to base a strategy upon. The question that needs to be addressed in Congressional hearings is, “are these forward deployed troops really necessary?”

b. PRC Military Expansion

China’s military expansion is already taking place while we have troops forward deployed to the region. China’s defense spending has increased dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s. China’s military modernization has included acquisition of weapon systems that boost the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) capability to project power beyond China’s shores – Russian Su-27s, Russian Kilo class submarines, in-flight refueling technology, and a continuing interest in buying or building one or more aircraft carriers.⁴² It has been argued that China’s increased military spending is simply a result of their improved economic situation over the past couple of decades and their desire to climb the international stature ladder. Whether China’s military expansion and modernization will prove effective remains to be seen, but the maintenance of U.S. troops in the region has historically done little to deter Chinese military expansion. Also, the Weinberger Doctrine still exists in American military policy, which states that the U.S. will not use force in international relations without specifying the endgame and an exit strategy. In dealing with the world’s largest social system, the Weinberger Doctrine

⁴¹ Hosokawa, 3.

⁴² Roy, Denny, “The China Threat Issue,” *Asian Survey* (Vol. XXXVI, No. 8, August 1996), 759.

essentially means that the U.S. would never use ground forces against China. Therefore, a logical policy would be to withdraw all ground forces from East Asia, which are both a source of instability in relations with the host nations (as the Okinawan rape of September 1995 has demonstrated) and a provocation to the Chinese, while strengthening American sea power in the Pacific.⁴³ These logical assumptions are excluded by elites and policy-makers in Congressional hearings in deference to the more powerful image of a “China in arms.”

c. U.S. Troops Keep Asian Markets Open

The notion that the presence of U.S. troops in Asia is necessary to keep the Asian markets open is also susceptible to closer evaluation. Nye testified to Congress that among the most important reasons for East Asia’s economic successes are American alliances in the region and the continued presence of substantial U.S. forces.⁴⁴ While the alliances are obviously crucial, the role that forward-deployed troops played in Asia’s economic development are less apparent. It has been global economic interdependence that developed and strengthened Asian markets, not the presence of American troops in the region. East Asian markets will not open wider to U.S. goods and services because of the presence of the Seventh Fleet.⁴⁵ It must be noted though that the current economic crisis in Asia has narrowed the markets for American goods, and especially American military equipment. The future may see a tighter market for American goods as the countries of the region strive to overcome this economic crisis by turning inward and

⁴³ Johnson, “The Okinawan Rape Incident and the End of the Cold War in East Asia,” 5.

⁴⁴ Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, “The Future of U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia and the Pacific,” One Hundred Fourth Congress, First Session, June 27, 1995, 132.

⁴⁵ Johnson, Chalmers and Keehn, E. B., “The Pentagon’s Ossified Strategy,” *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 1995), 112.

purchasing less foreign goods. But the correlation between Asian economic markets and U.S. military presence in Asia is hardly discernible.⁴⁶

d. It Costs Less To Station Troops In Japan Than It Would To Keep Them At Home

This statement was also professed by Nye to the House Committee on International Relations.⁴⁷ While it is true that Japan is the United States' most generous partner in providing host nation support, up to six billion dollars annually, Johnson would argue that it is not necessarily cheaper to keep the troops in Japan. The cost of America's East Asian obligations is nearly forty billion dollars a year.⁴⁸ Since most of the Japanese funds actually go toward salaries of Japanese employees of the American forces, local construction costs, utilities, and rents for confiscated lands, Johnson argues that basing the 47,000 U.S. troops currently in Japan in the United States would save more than the six billion dollars paid by the government of Japan and also contribute greatly to the economies of states that have suffered from base closures.⁴⁹ Opportunity costs, such as the money spent by troops off base, obviously benefit the hosts of these troops, and must be considered when analyzing the total costs where to station these troops.

⁴⁶ Chalmers Johnson argues that Nye's statement that American troops helped to keep Asian markets open is contradictory because it implies that if we did not have troops in Asia, then the American annual \$100 billion deficit in trade with Asia might be even larger, in "The Okinawan Rape Incident and the End of the Cold War in Asia," 5.

⁴⁷ Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, "The Future of U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia and the Pacific," One Hundred Fourth Congress, First Session, June 27, 1995, 133.

⁴⁸ Carpenter, Ted Galen, "Paternalism and Dependence: The U.S.-Japanese Security Relationship," 4-5.

⁴⁹ Johnson, "The Okinawan Rape Incident and the End of the Cold War in East Asia," 6.

B. WHY MYTHS ARE PERPETUATED IN CONGRESS

Congress has established itself as a mainstay in the formulation of foreign policy. It has done so largely through the democratization of Congress and the expansion of the various committees, sub-committees, and staffs that now participate in foreign policy analysis. Through hearings of these committees and sub-committees, prominent scholars, businessmen, and Department of Defense officials can present their views on certain policy issues.

Qualified individuals holding no official position in the government can be invited to speak on the record in Congressional hearings and to provide data to individual Congressmen or memoranda for particular committees...It is precisely because Congress is a political body of representatives elected through partisan processes, with an explicit majority-minority partisan structure in its committees, that the intellectual and informational resources available outside the government have at least a chance of being brought to bear.⁵⁰

Why is it then, with the abundance of resources available for analysis, that these “myths” were allowed to be perpetuated in the Congressional analysis of U.S. foreign policy toward Japan prior to the signing of the Joint Declaration on Security? One reason might be that the various committees and sub-committees contributed to the framing of these issues by inviting primarily outside specialists in favor of the Nye Initiative to testify in hearings, including Nye himself.⁵¹ Proponents of restructuring the U.S. forward presence

⁵⁰ Committee for Economic Development, *Congressional Decision-Making for National Security* (New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1974), 21.

⁵¹ Of the six hearings of the House Committee on International Relations analyzed (Feb 2 and 9, Mar 16, Jun 27, Oct 25 and 30, 1995) during the formative period of the new Joint Declaration on Security, only one speaker (of eight), Dr. Kenneth Pyle of the National Bureau of Asian Research, opposed the current forward presence structure in Asia. He cited that “the US playing a role akin to mercenaries does suit the national character of the Americans nor does a dependency role square with Japanese national traditions.” All of the other speakers took the 100,000 troop level as a given. Hearings of the Committee *since* the signing of the Joint Declaration have included numerous speakers opposed to the fixed troop level in Asia. This argument is hampered now by the fact now that the Joint Declaration on Security represents a U.S. promise to maintain current troop levels in the region and to renege on that promise now would reduce the trust between the two countries. The argument is that the time to have the discussions about troop levels

would not be as quick to accept the aforementioned “strategic myths.” Thus, these “strategic myths” that the Nye Initiative proffers were strengthened as a result of these congressional hearings.

Another possible reason for decision-makers’ acquiescence to existing security arrangements with Japan may be explained by parochial concerns. Under existing security arrangements, Japan is one of America’s biggest customers for weapons. Japan buys large amounts of military equipment and services from the U.S. every year. Interoperability of major systems, purchased directly or license built, is a major aspect of the Japan-U.S. security relationship.⁵² The list of U.S. equipment in the Japanese inventory includes Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft, Patriot missile batteries, AEGIS missile systems for destroyers, F-15 fighter aircraft, P-3 maritime patrol aircraft, C-130 cargo planes, and SH-60 helicopters. It can be argued that many in the Pentagon’s “lucrative trade agency”⁵³ may want to see the current security relationship with Japan continue to sustain the influx of Japanese capital for these weapons systems. The United States is actively promoting arms sales throughout the region while claiming that its forces are there to minimize the threat of armed conflict. This dichotomy only adds to the potential instability in the Asia Pacific region.

was before the Treaty was signed, not now. The current arguments, though, are certainly a step in the right direction.

⁵² Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, “United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region,” February 1995, 18.

⁵³ Chalmers Johnson uses this term in describing the Pentagon in one of its lesser known roles as depicted in Jeff Shear’s book, *The Keys to the Kingdom: The FS-X Deal and the Selling of America’s Future to Japan* (Doubleday, 1994), in his article “The Okinawan Rape Incident and the End of the Cold War in Asia,” 7.

A third reason why the myths are continued has to do with electoral politics.

Robert A. Pastor argues that the main purpose of Congress-dominant foreign policies is to send signals to three groups: to constituents to show that their Congressman has heard their complaints, to the administration to pursue a particular interest more vigorously, or to a foreign government to correct a particular problem, whether it is a closed market or a closed political system.⁵⁴ The current situation in Northeast Asia does not satisfy any of these three requisites and, thus, does not merit greater Congressional action on foreign policy-making in that region. Comparatively, there was a lot more public attention paid to Latin American areas such as Panama or Nicaragua in the 1980s due to various human rights violations and the press coverage of such. Thus, Congressional action was necessary to appease respective constituencies. In Asia in the 1990s, there is not a great public outcry over the removal or restructuring of U.S. troops other than arguments made in academia. Congressmen are not obligated by electoral concerns, nor by grandstanding or maintaining partisan lines, into taking any given action and are able to accept the “strategic myths” and the status quo in the region.

C. SUMMARY

The Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security signed at the Clinton-Hashimoto Summit was the result of two years of both governments conducting an intensive review of the evolving political and security environment of the Asia-Pacific region. The main tenet of this new security agreement is the maintenance of the current level of U.S. troops forward deployed to the region. It is rather apparent why the Japanese government would

⁵⁴ Pastor, Robert A., “Disagreeing on Latin America,” in *The President, the Congress, and the Making of Foreign Policy* ed. Paul E. Peterson (Norman, OK and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994), 224.

readily accept such a situation. Their remarkable economic growth over the past four decades was due, in no small part, to the fact that they were able to minimize their defense expenditures while covered under the U.S. military umbrella. That is to say, they were enjoying their “free ride.” The reasons for U.S. persistence in maintaining current forward deployed troop levels are not as apparent. The foreign policy adopted toward Japan combines a combination of approaches.

Congress certainly plays a dominant role in modern day decision-making in foreign policy. In the case of Japan, these decisions have been influenced by much more than just a simple electoral explanation. The framing of certain issues and the creation of strategic myths concerning the region have been very influential in the development of the revised Japan-U.S. alliance. The result is a policy that limits drastic change from the pre-existing cold war strategies in the region. This resistance to change in the region may prove counterproductive to the goals that the U.S. is promoting in the region, namely stability and prosperity. Policy makers need to move beyond the strategic myths and traditional ideologies that greatly influence today’s decision-making and develop strategies that will truly last into the next century.

The tenets of the Joint Declaration on Security can offer a promising relationship between the U.S. and Japan in the next century. U.S. policy toward the region, though, does seem to still have remnants of cold war strategy. What is needed at the U.S. strategic level is an in-depth analysis on the cost effectiveness of forward deployment, the actual number of troops necessary in the region to satisfy U.S. objectives, and the actual

roles that these troops play in the region. It is the role of the government, Congress and bureaucracy both, to instigate such investigations.

IV. FACTORS IN JAPAN AFFECTING THE ALLIANCE

Having examined how the security relationship between the U.S. and Japan was formulated and described how policymakers in the U.S. view this alliance, it is vital to analyze the factors that are calling for a change to this relationship. These factors include public opinion in both Japan and the U.S., and economic concerns. These concerns are amplified in Okinawa, where the largest concentrations of U.S. personnel in Japan are stationed.

A. PUBLIC OPINION

A recent public opinion poll in Japan shows that although 70% of those polled favor the U.S.-Japan alliance, 67% want the U.S. bases in Japan reduced or removed.⁵⁵ There also seem to be misperceptions in both countries as to why the U.S. troops are actually stationed in Japan.

The Japanese public tends to perceive the U.S. bases in Japan as relics left over from the post-World War II occupation era. They have persisted for more than fifty years only because of the Cold War. The U.S. public, on the other hand, tends to feel that the U.S. is doing Japan a favor by stationing troops there and protecting Japan. Since both Japanese and American perceptions have some truth to them, the gap between them could undermine the alliance. In order to ensure that the alliance retains the approval of both the Japanese and the American people, it is necessary to reduce the burdens on both sides and to avoid friction as much as possible.⁵⁶

There are factions within both countries that wish to see this relationship altered, namely in the shape of a restructuring of the U.S. forward-stationed troops.

⁵⁵ Asahi Shimbun poll of May 15, 1996.

⁵⁶ Taoka, Shunji, "The Japanese-American Security Treaty Without a U.S. Military Presence," Japan Policy Research Institute Working Paper No. 31, March 1997, 3.

Nowhere is this more evident than on Okinawa, where 26,000 of the 47,000 troops in Japan are stationed and public opinion is almost unanimously in favor of removing U.S. bases. The rape of a twelve-year-old girl by three American servicemen in 1995 has made the removal of U.S. troops from Japan's southern island a major political debate and brought into question why U.S. troops still remain in Asia years after the end of the Cold War. The Okinawan rape incident is not exactly an isolated incident either. Since the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese rule in 1972, U.S. servicemen have committed more than a crime a day on the southern Japanese island.⁵⁷ Acts of violence by U.S. troops on the island happen far too often to be overlooked or accepted as random occurrences. The frequency of these crimes committed by U.S. personnel have left a city councilwoman from Naha City, Okinawa wondering how many more times the U.S. Ambassador to Japan would have to say he was sorry for the behavior of U.S. troops on the island.⁵⁸

There are several other reasons why the Okinawans would like to see the Americans off of the island. Okinawa lags behind mainland Japan in economic development. The per capita income on Okinawa is only 75% of that of all of Japan and the unemployment rate on the island is twice that of the rest of the country. Okinawans blame these shortfalls on the presence of U.S. bases. The 39 American facilities on the island cover 20% of the total area of Okinawa. Most of these facilities are concentrated in the densely populated central and southern parts of the island. The presence of the

⁵⁷ Johnson, Chalmers, "The Okinawan Rape Incident and the End of the Cold War in Asia," 3.

⁵⁸ Dunphy, Harry, "Women Target Overseas Troops," *Associated Press News Release*, October 9, 1998. The article expresses the concern of both American and Japanese women's groups to the frequency of crimes committed by American troops on Okinawa, the latest being a hit and run accident involving a serviceman on October 7, 1998 that critically injured an 18-year-old Japanese student.

bases in these areas makes urban development impossible.⁵⁹ Thus the island is deprived of the industrial infrastructure necessary for economic development. Also, unlike the U.S. bases in the rest of Japan, which are on state-owned property, 30% of the bases in Okinawa are on privately owned property. The owners of this property are essentially forced into leasing this land to the U.S. government. This fact obviously breeds the discontent that many Okinawans feel toward the U.S. presence. The U.S.-Japan Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), established in November 1995 by both of the governments, has concluded that the U.S. will close or downsize eleven of the military installations on Okinawa and return to Japan approximately twenty percent of the land now occupied by U.S. forces. Although this is a step in the right direction, and will relieve some of the aforementioned burdens on the Okinawans, the plan does not call for a reduction of the troop sizes on the island. Rather, it just represents shifting troops, and the problems associated with them, to other parts of the island.

Waning public support in the United States could also have an impact on the future of the U.S. presence in the region. The U.S. cannot long sustain a commitment without the support of the public, and close consultations with Congress are important in this effort.⁶⁰ It was easier to convince the public of the benefits of forward deployment when there was a large, generally understood, threat. In the post-Cold War era, the threat is not so clear, especially in the Asia Pacific region, thus it is harder to sell Americans on keeping 100,000 troops in the Asia Pacific region. As Americans struggle with crime, drugs, poverty, healthcare, and other pressing concerns, convincing them that American

⁵⁹ Taken from Governor Ota's testimony to the Japanese Supreme Court on July 10, 1996.

⁶⁰ *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (The White House, May 1997), 10.

troops should remain in Asia to protect wealthy Japanese and Koreans from an ambiguous threat, or even worse, Asians from the Japanese, will become more difficult.⁶¹

B. ECONOMIC CONCERNS

The largest of economic concerns has to do with the Host Nation Support (HNS) that the government of Japan provides to the U.S. to keep the troops on Japanese soil. Japan is by far the largest contributor of HNS to the U.S. in the world, providing nearly six billion dollars annually. The second leading contributor, Korea, is a distant second, providing roughly 290 million dollars, while Germany provides only 80 million dollars. The current financial crisis in Japan and the rest of Asia is directly affecting the Japanese government's ability to finance its support of the U.S. forces in Japan.⁶² The current arrangement, negotiated under a Special Measures Agreement of 1995, commits Japanese HNS through the end of fiscal year 2001 (March 2002). Beyond then, it is unclear that the Japanese will be able to, or will desire to, continue such support. This burden (HNS) to Japanese taxpayers hangs like a darkening cloud over the future of the alliance.⁶³

Although substantive, Japan's HNS actually pays only a small fraction of the total cost of the U.S. security commitment to Japan.⁶⁴ The actual cost of America's East Asian security commitments, in the estimate of the CATO Institute⁶⁵, is just under 40 billion

⁶¹ Rodeman, Christopher A., "Time for a Change? Post-Cold War U.S. Grand Strategy in Northeast Asia," Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 1994, 43.

⁶² Taoka, Shunji, "The Japanese-American Security Treaty Without a U.S. Military Presence," 6.

⁶³ Hosokawa, Morohiro, "Are U.S. Troops in Japan Needed? Reforming the Alliance," *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 1998), 5.

⁶⁴ "Toward a New Relationship with Japan," *CATO Handbook for Congress, 105th Congress*. [<http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb105-47.html>].

⁶⁵ The CATO Institute is a non-partisan public policy research foundation headquartered in Washington D.C. It is named for "Cato's Letters," libertarian pamphlets that helped lay the philosophical foundation for the American Revolution.

dollars annually. To measure the total cost, it is necessary to consider not only the expenses of the forces stationed in Japan and Korea but also that of the air, ground, and naval units that exist to reinforce the forward-deployed forces if trouble breaks out in the region.⁶⁶ In the post-Cold War era of American politics, resources are extremely limited, and the defense budget has been the target of many reductions. When looking for downsizing options, the U.S. government should consider restructuring its defense strategy and its forward-stationed troops. The costs of moving these forward-stationed troops to other, U.S., areas could be substantial as well. In the long term, though, these costs would balance out, as it would cost less to operate these troops from the U.S. or from U.S. territories. Also, there is a belief that the Japanese government would pay some of the costs of moving these troops elsewhere. According to Japanese journalist Shunji Taoka, who specializes in military affairs, there is no question that there would be strong public support in Japan for its government to finance the cost of troop movements and construction of necessary facilities in Hawaii or Guam to support these troop movements.⁶⁷ In other words, the Japanese government might be willing to make the short term financial commitments to reduce its long-term financial burdens.

It is clear that the status quo of U.S. presence in the Asia Pacific region can not last. The Japanese no longer desire such presence, and the Americans will not be able to afford it in the long run. The time for the U.S. to look at restructuring its forward presence is now, when Americans have the capability to shape the environment in ways amenable to the concerns of the United States throughout the next century.

⁶⁶ Carpenter, Ted Galen, "Paternalism and Dependence: The U.S.-Japanese Security Relationship," 4.

⁶⁷ Taoka, Shunji, "The Japanese-American Security Treaty Without a U.S. Military Presence," 7.

V. SUGGESTED FORWARD-STATIONED TROOP STRUCTURE

A. U.S. SECURITY STRATEGY IN EAST ASIA

The U.S. National Security Strategy states that forward stationing of military forces in foreign territories serves to promote regional stability, deter aggression and coercion among the region's players, prevent and reduce conflicts and threats, and serve as role models for militaries in emerging democracies.⁶⁸ In the post-Cold War era, U.S. resources available for commitment to overseas stations are finite. Therefore, it must be questioned whether or not the U.S. can satisfy its security objectives with means other than the forward stationing of troops in foreign territories. The U.S. ability to deter potential adversaries in peacetime depends on several factors, particularly on our demonstrated will and ability to uphold our security commitments when they are challenged.⁶⁹ The U.S. can continue to demonstrate its will and ability to meet security commitments overseas with forces stationed primarily in the U.S. and its territories. These options need to be explored by U.S. policy makers.

As previously discussed, East Asia is an area that is ripe for such exploration. Recent events, however, contradict such thinking. Former Prime Minister Hosokawa has stated that the basic thrust in the Nye report on East Asian security that we can put Japan-U.S. security ties back on track with minor adjustments is misguided.⁷⁰ What is needed is a redefinition of the alliance that would include a massive restructuring of the forward-deployed U.S. troops in East Asia. This restructuring should be centered on a naval

⁶⁸ *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (The White House, May 1997), 8.

⁶⁹ *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, 9.

⁷⁰ Keynote address by Morihiro Hosokawa given to the Japan America Society of the State of Washington titled "Rebuilding the U.S.-Japan Security Structure" given in Seattle, Washington on March 12, 1996.

strategy for the United States. It is the goal of this chapter to show that the U.S. can relocate its ground and air forces in East Asia, and rely on its' naval presence to accomplish its security goals.⁷¹ Such restructuring done hastily could increase the level of instability in the region. Thus, this restructuring of the U.S. forward presence needs to be done with the utmost cooperation and participation of the region's countries. Such transparency and dialogue could serve to allay the historical suspicions that East Asian countries have of each other.

B. U.S. FORCE STRUCTURE IN EAST ASIA

Established in 1957, U.S. Forces, Japan (USFJ), with its U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Marine Corps elements, consists of about 47,000 personnel. U.S. Forces are stationed in Japan pursuant to the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960.⁷² Under Article V of this treaty, the U.S. forces' areas of responsibility are the land areas of the Japanese archipelago and the adjoining sea areas out to twelve nautical miles. Under Article VI of the same treaty, the U.S. is given use of Japanese facilities for maintaining regional security. U.S. forces are dispersed among 91 facilities on Honshu, Kyushu, and Okinawa covering approximately 78,000 acres. Almost three-quarters of these facilities are located on Okinawa, covering nearly twenty percent of the entire landmass of the small southern island.

⁷¹ It is understood that U.S. ground and air troops have historically provided a regional balance to those of China and Korea, acting as a substitute for such Japanese forces. With a withdrawal of U.S. ground and air troops, it could reasonably be possible that Japan would have to expand its forces to maintain this regional balance. This military expansion, if it were to occur, would need to occur with a certain transparency that future regional security groups should be able to provide.

⁷² All USFJ personnel numbers were retrieved from the USFJ Fact Sheet. [<http://www.yokota.af.mil/usfj/usfjfact.html>].

U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) is a joint headquarters through which American combat forces would be sent to the Combined Forces Command (CFC), an integrated headquarters established by the governments of the U.S. and Korea in 1978. The USFK is comprised of approximately 37,000 American personnel. Its elements include a large Eighth U.S. Army command (27,500 personnel), a relatively large Seventh Air Force (8,300 personnel), and a tiny naval element.⁷³ The U.S. legal obligations are those under United Nations (U.N.) Security Council Resolutions of 1950, by which the U.S. leads the U.N. command, and the ROK-U.S. Mutual Security Agreement of 1954, which commits both nations to assist each other in case of an outside attack. The CFC, which has always been under the command of an American general, is responsible for planning the defense of the ROK and, if necessary, directing the ROK-U.S. combined combat forces to defeat enemy aggression.

C. U.S. TROOP REDUCTION?

With an expanded military role for Japan in the region, the U.S. would be able to reduce its force structure there. The U.S. reluctance to do so is a reversion to cold war politics. The fundamental reason for obfuscation seems to be nervousness about change on the part of both governments.⁷⁴ The CATO Institute recommends that the U.S. redeploy approximately half of its air and naval units now stationed in Japan to Guam and other U.S. territories in the Central Pacific and demobilize the rest.⁷⁵ There are several reasons why the U.S. should take the initiative in drawing down their troop

⁷³ All USFK personnel numbers retrieved from USFK homepage.

[<http://www.korea.army.mil/usfk/pao/backgrounders/backgrndr20htm.html>].

⁷⁴ Johnson, Chalmers, "The Okinawan Rape Incident and the End of the Cold War in Asia," 4.

⁷⁵ "Toward a New Relationship with Japan," *CATO Handbook for Congress, 105th Congress*. [<http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb105-47.html>].

strengths in the Asia Pacific region. Two of these have previously been discussed, the shifting public opinion in both countries on issues related to forward stationing and the economic concerns of both countries and Japan's current economic crisis. Other reasons include the fact that the changing world order has modified the missions of these forward-deployed troops and the fact there are just too many troops forward-stationed in Japan.

1. Changing Mission

The forward-deployed troops in East Asia came about as a result of the Cold War and the bipolar world that existed for the four decades of the Cold War. The Cold War gave the forward stationing of U.S. troops in East Asia a certain justification. Forward presence was necessary to deter and contain communist aggression from the Soviet Union. The Cold War American-devised system of bilateral security alliances in the Pacific region, coupled with the forward deployment of substantial American military personnel and material, was an effective response to Washington's assessment of the danger of Soviet expansionism. These forward-deployed troops contained Soviet expansion and aided in maintaining relative peace and prosperity in the Asia Pacific region. The American ability to maintain such a posture, due, in large part, to the positive effects that Asia's economic boom in the 1980s had on the American economy, also played a large role in the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union.

In the post-Cold War era, this justification for maintaining military presence in the region diminishes. The centrality of forward deployment in the U.S. East Asian foreign policy may be untenable in the long run. Without the monolithic Soviet Union to

threaten their very existence, the host countries may begin to question the purpose of the American troops permanently stationed on their soil. The stated threats in U.S. foreign policy are as mentioned above, in the Nye report. The underlying motives may be to keep an eye on Japan and appease the fears of the region's other countries about a remilitarization of Japan. Although these reasons are important in showing the countries of the region that the United States intends to remain engaged, it seems that there are more efficient and cost-effective ways to accomplish the same goals. The questions are, then, whether these threats are important enough in American foreign policy to maintain the current levels of forward-deployed troops, and how long will these troops need to remain in the region. It must also be determined if there are better ways to accomplish the same goals that will be supportable well into the next century. It is difficult to justify preserving expensive and dangerous commitments indefinitely merely to spare Japan and its neighbors the difficulties of confronting and overcoming old animosities.⁷⁶

2. Too Many Troops in Japan

The United States currently deploys approximately 16,500 marines on Okinawa. The assumed role of these forces is to be within the region to deter any aggressive action by North Korea. The Pentagon fears that any reduction of these forces would send the wrong signal to the North Koreans about American intentions in the region. But the fact is that the United States Navy does not have in-theater sealift capacity to move all of the Marine units from Okinawa to "real forward areas" anyway. If other U.S. Marine or Army units were using the limited amphibious and airlift capacity for an emergency in

⁷⁶ "Toward a New Relationship with Japan," *CATO Handbook for Congress, 105th Congress*. [<http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb105-47.html>].

Korea or the Middle East, most of the Marines in Okinawa would be temporarily stranded there as troops in exile.⁷⁷ This being the case, it would make sense, and satisfy the concerns of many of the Okinawans, to relocate these Marines to other areas in the Pacific, namely Hawaii or Guam, where they could be coupled with the sealift capability to complete their assigned missions.

D. LIMITED FORWARD DEPLOYMENT/POWER PROJECTION

The United States insistence on forward stationing of troops in Asia has limited the United States' flexibility in an era of uncertainty where flexibility should become the Pentagon's primary goal. It is not the goal of this paper to argue for a return to American isolationism, for American presence and commitment are vital to security in the Asia Pacific region. Rather, this paper argues that this presence might better be served with a strategy of power projection, or limited forward deployment. The centerpiece of such a power projection strategy would be the forward deployed naval forces. What is needed within this limited deployment strategy is a systematic and slow withdrawal of the ground forces and air forces, first from Okinawa, and then from mainland Japan. This would be done with ample notice to, and coordination with, the region's players to prevent the potential panic that could be caused by a reduction in American forward-deployed troop structure. These troops could be relocated within the Pacific area of responsibility, but in American territories, such as Hawaii or Guam. Power projection strategy entails a reordering of priorities toward the attainment of a genuine ability to

⁷⁷ Argued in Taoka, "The Japanese-American Security Treaty Without a U.S. Military Presence," 7 and Johnson, Chalmers, "Why are American Troops Still in Okinawa?" Japan Policy Research Institute Critique (Vol. 4, No. 2), April 1997.

expeditiously deploy tailored force packages from home bases to potential areas of crisis or impending conflict.⁷⁸ Future restructuring could also include a gradual “Koreanization” of Korea’s defense. Such a restructuring does not call for a drastic reduction of American presence in the Asia Pacific region, though, as a new relationship should focus on continued training and exercises in the region and continued access to certain facilities in the region.

1. Limited Flexibility

The present international security environment presents the U.S. with much uncertainty. There is not one single discernible major threat; thus American forces need to be tailored to counter a wide realm of existing and potential threats to their security and prosperity. Forward stationing of large numbers of American troops somewhat limits the flexibility that is needed in the present security environment. Implementing a concept of power projection rather than forward stationing could provide U.S. strategic planners with increased flexibility. Today’s United States Army has only ten divisions, one of which is tied down in Korea, leaving only nine available for contingencies. The Marine Corps division in Okinawa, one of three in the Marine Corps, is also tied down even though battalions often go afloat to train elsewhere in Asia. Tying these forces to specific geographic concerns in East Asia limits their flexibility in responding to other contingencies within and outside of the Asia Pacific region. A concept of power projection rather than forward stationing would still allow these forces to respond to a

⁷⁸ Crist, George, “A U.S. Military Strategy for a Changing World,” *Strategic Review* (Winter 1990), 13, cited in LT Christopher Rodeman’s thesis “Time for Change? Post Cold War Strategy in Northeast Asia,” Naval Postgraduate School, December 1994.

Korean conflict, albeit not in as timely a manner⁷⁹, as well as allow them to respond to other contingencies.

2. Relocation of Ground and Air Forces

Key to this concept of limited forward deployment and power projection is the relocation of the Marine Corps units in Okinawa and the Air Force units in Okinawa and mainland Japan to either Hawaii or Guam. Taoka argues that, although he supports the military and political alliance between the U.S. and Japan, the deployment of Marines in Japan is no longer necessary and has become, in fact, harmful to the alliance.⁸⁰ This is also the position taken by the Democratic Party of Japan (the major opposition party), and former Prime Minister Hosokawa. On strategic and logistical grounds, there is also high level opposition within the Marine Corps to the continued stationing of the Marines in Okinawa.⁸¹ The feeling is that they no longer have a mission there. The necessity of U.S. ground troops is essentially being challenged, even with uncertainties dogging both the Korean peninsula and China.⁸²

With the relocation of the Okinawa Marines, the U.S. Navy's Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG), stationed in Sasebo, and the various Marine Corps air assets could follow. The ARG and the air assets should also be relocated to wherever the Marines are located, as their primary mission is support of these Marines. The most logical relocation site for the Marine Corps Division, the ARG, and the Marine Corps air

⁷⁹ This strategy is making the general assumption that the U.S. would be able to successfully "Koreanize" Korea's defense without hostilities breaking out on the peninsula and gradually relocate the U.S. Eighth Army and U.S. Seventh Air Force units presently in the Republic of Korea to Guam or Hawaii.

⁸⁰ Taoka, 1.

⁸¹ Smith, Patrick, "Pay Attention to Okinawans and Close the U.S. Bases," *International Herald Tribune*, March 6, 1998.

⁸² Miller, Matt, "U.S. Welcome Wears Thin in Okinawa," *Copley News Service*, January 20, 1997.

wing would be to Hawaii. The Marine Corps III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) stationed in Okinawa could be combined with III MEF Forces Hawaii at Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii. Under the Hawaii Military Land Use Master Plan, the Marine Corps is planned to be given over a 1000 acres on Bellows Air Force Base in Hawaii by October 1999 for amphibious training purposes.⁸³ This land could also be used to ease the combining of the two commands. Hawaii also has the military facilities to accommodate the ARG and Marine Corps air assets. These Marine Corps units would still be available to participate in exercises and real-world contingencies in Asia when necessary, and could do so on a rotational deployment basis. Also, their presence in Hawaii would give the Hawaiian economy a needed boost, as would any government construction that may be necessary to accommodate the relocated Marines.

It would seem reasonable, as well, that the Air Force units stationed in Okinawa and mainland Japan could project their power just as potently in the Asia Pacific region from Guam and Hawaii. In fact, Anderson Air Force Base on Guam has been the prepositioning base of choice for the most recent Air Force demonstrations of power projection. It is unclear whether the Japanese government would allow the use of the Japanese air bases for anything other than the protection of Japan. Under protocols of the 1960 Mutual Security Treaty, the United States must ask the Japanese government in a "prior consultation" to use U.S. bases on Japanese territory for any direct act of war outside of Japan. This being the case, it would not deteriorate the power projection capability of the U.S. Air Force greatly by relocating the Air Force units currently

⁸³ United States Pacific Command News Release, March 20, 1998. [<http://www.pacom.mil/ref/98/ref04-98.html>].

stationed in Japan to Guam and Hawaii. These Air Force units in Japan include one fighter wing, one multi-mission wing, and one airlift wing. They could be coupled with the existing air base wing in Guam or the existing air base wing in Hawaii and still flex their power projection capabilities.

The Air Force seems to be reshaping its forces in the post-Cold War era to meet such power projection capabilities. In a recent message to the force, Air Force Chief of Staff, General Michael Ryan, suggested a thorough overhaul of the very structure and operations concept of the post-Cold War Air Force.⁸⁴ Instead of focusing on a “big war” by sending large numbers of U.S. warplanes to well-stocked allied bases overseas, the new plans call for a leaner force that must respond quickly to crises in austere environments – and sometimes stay for long periods of time.⁸⁵ Such leaner forces would give the Air Force the flexibility they would need for deterrence in the future security environment and support their relocation from Japan to U.S. territories.

3. Continued Naval Presence

To continue to meet their national security goals of continued engagement with the countries of Northeast Asia and to maintain stability and prosperity into the next century, the U.S. should rely on its forward-deployed naval assets. In a study conducted by Robert Looney, David Schrad, and Ronald Brown to determine the economic benefits derived from forward-engaged naval forces, they postulated that:

Crises tend to have a negative impact on markets and economic activity. Forward-engaged naval forces are often the first to respond to a crisis and their

⁸⁴ Grier, Peter, “The Retention Problem Spreads,” *Air Force Magazine*, October 1998, 60.

⁸⁵ Schafer, Susanne M., “Air Force Has Post Cold War Remake,” *Associated Press Release*, August 5, 1998.

being on scene usually has a stabilizing political influence. The stabilizing influence extends to economic activity as well.⁸⁶

Naval forces, due to their ability to react to a wide array of contingencies in a timely manner, provide a flexibility that ground and air forces can not. While ground and air forces have needs to operate in an adversary's territorial or air space, naval assets can complete missions from the sea, an international arena. Thus, naval forces remain the first forces to respond to international crises and it makes sense to keep naval forces forward-deployed to maintain the stabilizing political influence that power projection yields.

The maintenance of the Forward Deployed Naval Forces (FDNF) in Yokosuka, Japan represents the most cost effective and efficient way for the United States to remain militarily engaged with Japan and the other countries of the region. The current binding agreements between Japan and the U.S., including that of HNS and the Status of Forces Agreement, could remain applicable with the maintenance of the naval forces in Japan. Substantial support forces for the FDNF would need to remain in place, but the relocation of the U.S. ground and air forces from Japan would foster the Japanese for a level of HNS that they would be more willing to contend with. The U.S. would then be able to use these naval forces for crisis response within the region, and, if necessary, neighboring regions, to continue to show that they are committed to stability in the Asia Pacific region. Even in the absence of foreseeable threats, naval forward engagement improves

⁸⁶ "Estimating the Economic Benefits Derived From Forward-Engaged Naval Forces," in Ron Brown, Siriphong Lawphongpanich, Robert Looney, Daniel Moran, David Schrady, James Wirtz, and David Yost, "Forward Engagement Requirements for U.S. Naval Forces: New Analytical Approaches," Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, July 23, 1997.

our chances of deterring aggression, and of forestalling escalation and preserving our political options, should deterrence fail.⁸⁷

4. Koreanization of Korean Defense

Future restructuring of U.S. troops in the Asia Pacific region could also be aided by a gradual Koreanization of South Korea's defense. Attempts at peace talks between the two Koreas have failed to even get started because of the DPRK's insistence on one major concession: the withdrawal or reduction of U.S. troops in Korea. Quotes such as "North Korea threatened to withdraw from peace talks for the Korean peninsula because the U.S. refused to consider discussion of an American troop withdrawal from South Korea"⁸⁸ have become commonplace during attempted Korean peace talks. To get the peace talks started, the U.S. should consider discussing a plan for reduction or removal of U.S. troops in Korea.

The biggest threat to the DPRK is the ROK-U.S. alliance, even though the U.S. and ROK would never launch a war against the DPRK because they both know that such a war would be too costly and produce no significant gain. Under present military circumstances, the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), backed up by U.S. reinforcements, would win any mid- to high-intensity conflict in 120 days or less – but Seoul would be substantially destroyed in the first few days.⁸⁹ Current policy concedes that if the North decided to attack, the CFC could not stop them initially. The

⁸⁷ Moran, Daniel, "Conventional Deterrence, Naval Crisis Response, and the Contemporary Security Environment," in Ron Brown, Siriphong Lawphongpanich, Robert Looney, Daniel Moran, David Schrad, James Wirtz, and David Yost, "Forward Engagement Requirements for U.S. Naval Forces: New Analytical Approaches," Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, July 23, 1997.

⁸⁸ Higgins, Alexander G., "Korean Talks: No Agreement Reached," Associated Press News Release, March 21, 1998.

⁸⁹ Joint Military Net Assessment (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1991), 9-2.

Commander of U.S. Forces in the Pacific, Admiral Joseph Prueher, acknowledges that, although the North is too weak to sustain an invasion of the South, if the North decided to attack, hundreds of thousands (of South Koreans and Americans) would likely be killed.⁹⁰ This being the case, why have U.S. troops there at all? The current force structure on the peninsula is massive. DPRK has a reported 1.1 million personnel in uniform, while the ROK military numbers 650,000. The 37,000 U.S. troops in Korea pale in comparison to these huge armies. In fact, the U.S. presence in Korea makes up about only two percent of the total force structure in the two Koreas. The withdrawal or reduction in U.S. troops, or at least the willingness to discuss the issue by the U.S., could serve as a catalyst to get the inter-Korean peace talks started. The refusal by the U.S. to even discuss such possibilities indicates the dominance of Cold War thinking in U.S. foreign policy toward the Koreas.

The U.S. also continually overestimates the military threat of North Korea to justify the existence of troops in the South. Many analysts feel that North Korea, which lacks a strong industrial base and is rapidly losing the ability to feed and clothe its people, has the capacity to mount a full-scale war against the combined forces of the U.S. and South Korea.⁹¹ It is apparent and mandated under the Mutual Defense Treaty that any DPRK aggression would be met by the movement of additional U.S. forces to the region. The U.S. has the capability to provide such forces even if the troops in South Korea are removed. Thus, if their removal could have sweeping ramifications in inter-Korean dialogue, then the U.S. should explore such options.

⁹⁰ Matthews, William, "Prueher Sees Eased Threat in Asia," *Navy Times*, November 9, 1998, 4.

⁹¹ Shorrock, Tim, "Korea: New Korea Policy Needed." [www.kimsoft.com/1997/US-polic.html].

It is obviously still quite urgent that a system of rapid response to DPRK's threats should remain on the Korean peninsula, an area that has a very short early warning time and a shallow battlefield. But the U.S. should transfer these responsibilities of rapid response to the ROK forces. The ROK forces are already seen as technologically superior to those of the DPRK, and further developments in that area will continue to act as a deterrent to North Korean aggression. The U.S. should, therefore, in compliance with Article II of the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty which encourages "self-help" in deterrence of threats, and with the establishment of the CFC which does not specify that the Commander must be an American, give the command of the CFC to the ROK forces and allow them to absorb greater duties in their own country. This Koreanization of Korean defense could allow the U.S. to reduce its military presence on the peninsula.

5. Continued Engagement

If the U.S. were to undertake such a restructuring of their forward deployed posture, there would be a need for the U.S. to remain engaged in two ways: continued exercises with the countries of the region and ensured access to military facilities in the host countries when needed. It would remain to be seen whether or not the countries, namely Japan and Korea, would desire to continue annual exercises in the future if the U.S. withdraws air and ground troops. It seems likely, though, that these countries would continue to have much to gain from continued cooperation and participation with U.S. forces in such an environment. Continued training with the world's most potent military power could only improve the capabilities of those countries that choose to do so, not to mention fine tune the operational abilities of multinational forces. Future exercises could

possibly include the emerging military of China as well, as recent port visits to Chinese ports by U.S. Navy ships might indicate a potential for future engagement with the People's Liberation Army. Also, a recent visit to the Pentagon by General Zhang Wannian, the Vice Chairman of China's Central Military Committee, served to boost the trust between China and the U.S. and to deepen and advance the military relationships between the two countries.⁹²

Ensured access to military facilities in the region in times of crisis would make it easier for the U.S. to make such a transition. But the host countries might not be so quick to give such support. This is something that should be negotiated on paper with Japan and Korea prior to the removal of any U.S. troops from the region. A new and more appropriate American defense policy toward East Asia would stress access to the area rather than fixed bases.⁹³

⁹² Myers, Laura, "U.S., China OK Military Cooperation," *Associated Press News Release*, September 15, 1998.

⁹³ Johnson, Chalmers, "The Okinawan Rape Incident and the End of the Cold War in Asia," 8.

VI. REGIONAL FACTORS AFFECTING ALLIANCES AND MULTILATERALISM

Having proposed such a restructuring, it is now important to analyze some of the major obstacles that need to be overcome to make it come about. The largest impediments to reducing U.S. presence in East Asia are the strategic concerns of each of the countries in the region. It is widely believed that if the Americans reduce their presence in Asia, then a power vacuum would be created in the region. It is believed that this power vacuum will then cause an accelerated arms race among the region's countries. Added to these concerns is the fear of resurgent Japanese militarism by the countries that shared the brunt of Japanese aggression in the first half of the twentieth century, namely China and Korea, and by the United States. The way to help overcome these obstacles is through security and confidence-building measures that can be produced with multilateralism.

A. STRATEGIC CONCERNS

The post-Cold War environment in Asia represents a dichotomy. While the great powers of the region (China, Japan, U.S., Russia, and perhaps Korea) all seem to be co-existing peacefully, the dangers of instability remain in the region. It can be argued that all of the great powers in Asia have common interests in maintaining a stable, nuclear-free Korean peninsula and economic recovery in the region leading to a renewed economic prosperity. But even while these powers have common interests which currently create a relatively benign security atmosphere in Asia, this atmosphere is fragile. The Japanese are perhaps more concerned about the unpredictability of this security environment than about the present intentions or military capabilities of their

neighbors.⁹⁴ In fact, the potential sources of Northeast Asian conflicts are plentiful, and at a minimum include: long-standing Sino-Russian border disputes; competing Russian and Japanese claims to the Northern Territories; the unresolved dispute between Japan and South Korea over the Liancourt Rocks in the southern Sea of Japan; divided sovereignty on the Korean peninsula, where 1.2 million ROK and DPRK ground forces remain deployed against each other across the demilitarized zone; competing sovereignty claims of the Chinese regimes on mainland China and Taiwan; the unresolved dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea; and the competing claims to the Spratly and Paracel Islands among China, Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, and the Philippines.⁹⁵

With the perceived ascendancy of U.S. power in the region, and, indeed a real ascendancy if this thesis' proposals for restructuring were implemented, the regional powers would likely engage in a struggle for regional hegemony. This struggle is bound to occur eventually, as the U.S. can not remain physically engaged in Asia forever. When it does occur, each of the countries of the region is going to want to assume their rightful position in whatever system emerges. The key is to try to control the dimensions of that struggle, and influence it to gain outcomes that would be favorable to U.S. interests in the region. Multilateralism and the formation of regional security groups represent a means to control that struggle, and reduce the levels of unpredictability in the

⁹⁴ Fukuyama, Francis and Oh, Kongdan, *The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship After the Cold War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 1993), 7.

⁹⁵ Ball, Desmond, "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia Pacific Region," *International Security* (Winter 1993-94), 88.

region. Stability in Asia depends upon the benign coexistence between the region's nations. Multilateralism makes this benign coexistence easier to accomplish.

B. REGIONAL ARMS RACE

The void left by a U.S. restructuring is likely to cause defense build-ups across the board in Asia as each of the countries vie for positions within the region. It can be argued that such a regional arms race is already taking place among the industrialized countries of Asia. This militarization is just a side effect of the rapid economic growth that the countries of the region have experienced over the past several decades. As their involvement in the international economy grows, so does their need for an expanding military to ensure their continued access to the global market and maintenance of their financial, trade, and diplomatic ties with other countries. These arms races also are the result of the perceived shifts in geopolitical power of the U.S. and China within the region, with the latter on the ascendancy and the former being seen as in decline. The ongoing and across-the-board modernization and expansion of the arsenals of the countries in the region, and especially within ASEAN, is an example of the states preparing for the real possibility of major changes to the broader strategic environment in the longer term.⁹⁶ The prospect of an arms race in Southeast Asia and uncertainty about the directions of the defense policies of Japan, China, and South Korea encouraged advocates of various forms of multilateralism.⁹⁷

⁹⁶ Da Cunha, Derek, "U.S. Must Realign Naval Forces in Pacific to Keep Power Balance," *Singapore Straits Times*, May 30, 1997, 2.

⁹⁷ Olsen, Edward A., "Multilateral Security Arrangements in Northeast Asia," *Collection of Scholarly Papers on National Security* (Seoul: Korean National Defense University, 1998), 69.

C. FEAR OF JAPANESE MILITARISM

An ideology that must be overcome in U.S. foreign policy, and in the foreign policies of Japan's neighbors, if collective security is to work in Asia is the fear of the revival of Japanese militarism. These notions are simply outdated. Imperial Japan's expansionism in the 1930s and 1940s, as horrible as it was, arose from a specific set of conditions that bore little resemblance to the current or any reasonably foreseeable situation.⁹⁸ The insecurities of pre-World War II Japan stemmed from the fact that they were a burgeoning world power without the natural resources to sustain such aspirations. Thus they set out with expansionist foreign policy to accrue these natural resources and ensure their place among the world's great powers. Modern Japan is a completely different state. Japan already is one of the world's great powers and global economic interdependence provides Japan with her necessary resources. Japan would have nothing to gain from the use of military action to overturn the present world order. Perhaps more than any other nation, Japan benefits from international trade and neither needs nor has the incentive to attempt to alter this ideal situation through the use of military force.⁹⁹

It must be noted, though, that the fears of the other Asian countries of resurgent Japanese militarism can not be completely discounted. Whether real or imagined, perceptions of Tokyo's intentions could prompt regional actors who feel threatened by Japan to react in a manner inconsistent with normal balancing, thus creating instability and conditions prejudicial to U.S. security interests.¹⁰⁰ Japan's refusal to admit the

⁹⁸ Carpenter, Ted Galen, "Paternalism and Dependence: The U.S.-Japanese Security Relationship," 17-18.

⁹⁹ Taoka, Shunji, "The Japanese-American Security Treaty Without a U.S. Military Presence," Japan Policy Research Institute Working Paper No. 31, March 1997, 6.

¹⁰⁰ Rodeman, Christopher A., "Time for a Change? Post-Cold War U.S. Grand Strategy in Northeast Asia," Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 1994, 69.

wrongdoings of its previous military regimes does not help the situation. Such penitence could go a long way to appease some of the fears of the countries of the region. No amount of confidence building and information sharing will eliminate completely suspicions about Japan's true intentions in Asia unless that country unambiguously comes to terms with its historical legacy.¹⁰¹ Recent action along these lines has occurred between Japan and South Korea as Japan formally apologized to South Korea for its harsh 35-year colonial rule of South Korea from 1910-1945.¹⁰² But mainstreamers in Japan, which include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Defense Agency and the Self-Defense Forces, and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, do not see any particular need to offer a systemic apology for Japan's past errors in order to regain the trust of its Asian neighbors, although they pay lip service to this effort.¹⁰³ Sincere efforts by the Japanese to reconcile with its past must occur to ease the historical tensions among the countries in the region. Also, both East Asian and U.S. officials need to outgrow the simplistic assumption that Japan's military role must inevitably be one of extremes – either the rampant expansionism of six decades ago or the self-effacing dependency of the post-World War II era. They would likely play a role somewhere in between, that of a typical prosperous and conservative great power in the international system.¹⁰⁴

Hints of Japanese nationalism also make the other countries of the region feel uncomfortable. This nationalism has shown many different faces in Japan.

¹⁰¹ Japan Economic Institute of America, "Japan Strives to Raise Profile on Regional Security," JEI Report No. 8 (Vol. 1997), February 28, 1997, 11.

¹⁰² Coleman, Joseph, "Japan Apologizes to South Korea," *Associated Press News Release*, October 8, 1998.

¹⁰³ Fukuyama, Francis and Oh, Kongdan, *The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship After the Cold War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 1993), 35.

¹⁰⁴ "Toward a New Relationship with Japan," *CATO Handbook for Congress, 105th Congress*. [<http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb105-47.html>].

Japanese nationalism expresses itself in pride in the recovery from World War II and the surge to the forefront of global economies. That has been tempered by the bursting of the bubble economy of the late 1980s and 1990s. Japanese today are searching for a new identity and spiritual values to dilute materialism while avoiding the ultranationalism of the 1930s.¹⁰⁵

This nationalism, or more importantly to Japan's neighbors, this perceived nationalism, has manifested itself in various ways. Some of these expressions may seem somewhat trivial to Westerners, but are readily noted throughout Northeast Asia. Such examples include: visits by high-ranking government officials, including former Prime Minister Hashimoto, to the Yasukuni Shrine to the Japanese war dead, which includes executed war criminals; attempts by Japanese historians to "revise" Japan's school history books to remove the "masochistic" accounts of Japan's war crimes;¹⁰⁶ and the making of a movie which portrays as a hero General Hideki Tojo, whom Americans tried and hanged for his World War II crimes.¹⁰⁷ While such nationalistic trends may seem minute to some, others worry that these trends represent a flux that could usher in a new era of xenophobia.¹⁰⁸ Although it is probably true that the Japanese need to practice a bit more political sensitivity in such expressions of their nationalistic pride, for other East Asian countries to worry about Japanese xenophobia seems both paranoid and premature. Japanese society has directed its pride toward economic advances in previous decades, and until their economy recovers from its current slump, will continue to search for outlets for its nationalistic pride. It is possible that these outlets are tied to Japan's rich

¹⁰⁵ "Colonial Past Feeds Current Sentiments; Which Fuel Tensions," *The Nikkei Weekly*, Editorial and Commentary, August 18, 1997, 12.

¹⁰⁶ Saito, Sayuri, "Reconsidering History Education," *The Daily Yomiuri*, September 18, 1997, 3.

¹⁰⁷ The movie, "Pride, the Fateful Moment," played in Japanese movie houses in the Summer of 1998.

¹⁰⁸ Soh, Felix, "Japanese Nationalism Could Re-emerge," *The Singapore Straits Times*, August 31, 1996, 19.

heritage and spiritual values, and when thus expressed by Japanese society, should not be viewed by Japan's neighbors as an ominous development.

D. MULTILATERALISM AND REGIONAL SECURITY GROUPS

The key to ensuring that these trends of expanding militaries and increased fears of such militarization does not harm the stability of the region lies in multilateral security groups and the encouragement of confidence and security building measures among the players. Unlike Europe, Asia has not had much practice with multilateralism. Throughout the Cold War, Asian countries survived with various bilateral agreements placing them on either side of the bipolar world or leaving them in the middle without specific commitments to either side. In Asia, a set of U.S.-centered bilateral relationships became the central organizing principle, with multilateralism marginalized overall.¹⁰⁹ Bilateral arrangements alone will not suffice in Asia in the post-Cold War era, regional security groups need to be stressed. Japan could reasonably be expected to play a leading role in such security groups. American officials ought to adopt the position that, as the principal great power in the region, Japan will be expected to help stabilize East Asia, contribute to the resolution of disputes, and contain disruptive or expansionist threats that might emerge.¹¹⁰ If the U.S. were to restructure or reduce its presence in Asia, multilateralism could be a means to ensure a smooth transition.

Security dialogues between the countries, like those of the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF), and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asian Pacific

¹⁰⁹ Olsen, "Multilateral Security Arrangements in Northeast Asia," 56.

¹¹⁰ Carpenter, Ted Galen, "Paternalism and Dependence: The U.S.-Japanese Security Relationship," 24.

(CSCAP) need to continue to occur. Such forums provide for confidence building measures and information sharing that help to quell the historical fears that the countries of the region have of each other. It has become increasingly clear that such confidence and security building measures, properly crafted and carefully applied, are indeed appropriate to the Asia Pacific region in the post-Cold War era.¹¹¹ The U.S. should use its influence in the region to keep all of the players at the discussion table, particularly Japan, South Korea, and China.

There still remain, though, certain impediments that limit the range of discussion at these security dialogues between Japan and her Northeast Asian neighbors. Historical, territorial, and ideological confrontations continue to inhibit complete trust and confidence building between the nations. Territorial disputes remain between Japan and her neighbors (with South Korea over Takeshima, with China over Senkaku, and with Russia over the Northern Territories) that linger as possible catalysts to conflict. Also, China and both Koreas are skeptical of the reinvigorated security alliance between the U.S. and Japan as laid out at the Clinton-Hashimoto summit of 1996. Koreans are critical of an increased Japanese role in the U.S.-Japan security alliance and China views the April 1996 pledge by the U.S. and Japan to reinvigorate security ties as a containment strategy against them. Beijing has insisted that the purpose of reinvigorating the transpacific defense alliance and allowing greater Japanese participation in regional security is to thwart China's leadership ambitions both in Asia and in the world.¹¹²

¹¹¹ Cossa, Ralph A., *Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures* ed. Ralph A. Cossa (Washington D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), 1.

¹¹² Japan Economic Institute of America, "Japan Strives to Raise Profile on Regional Security," JEI Report No.8 (Vol. 1997), February 28, 1997, 8.

Although the U.S. would deny such a containment policy, the U.S. approach toward strengthening Japan's role in the region and encouraging multilateralism in the region is a form of containment, but a benign one that encourages China's participation in the system.

Regardless of the impediments, multilateralism has caught on in the Asia Pacific region, especially in Southeast Asia, since the end of the Cold War.

Asia's former inability to move beyond a multi-pronged bilateral stage began to change toward the end of the Cold War... Multilateralism was a means to simultaneously retain the engagement of the United States and pre-emptively constrain the potential power of the region's indigenous major powers – China and Japan.¹¹³

Multilateralism is favored by many of the region's players, but for different reasons.¹¹⁴

China sees multilateralism as a way to become a "normal" security country. South Korea has been at the forefront of multilateralism, proposing the Northeast Asia Security Dialogue (NEASED), a "track one" organization for enhancing and implementing confidence-building measures, which has not yet come to fruition. Korea sees multilateralism as a means to control its own fate in the international arena, which is a position that Korea has not held historically. Seoul's approach, moreover, reflects ROK recognition that the growing power of China and Japan require South Korea to hedge its bets through multilateralism.¹¹⁵ Japan could use multilateralism to minimize the fears of its neighbors concerning various initiatives that Japan would probably undergo upon a U.S. restructuring. The U.S., in turn, should view multilateralism as a de facto "exit

¹¹³ Olsen, "Multilateral Security Arrangements in Northeast Asia," 65.

¹¹⁴ Argument posed by Michael Stankiewicz, Coordinator for NEACD, at symposium entitled "Pacific Security Today: Security Implications of the Asian Economic Crisis," at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, November 5, 1998.

¹¹⁵ Olsen, "Multilateral Security Arrangements in Northeast Asia," 78.

strategy,” to develop an environment in the region that could peacefully function without the current level of hard U.S. commitment.

Regional security groups have existed in Asia for a few years with reasonable success, albeit at a track two level. CSCAP, which pre-dates ARF, has become a valuable colloquium for these countries to discuss security matters. CSCAP is a non-governmental or “track two” organization that enables government officials to engage in policy-related discussions with academicians, security specialists, and former foreign ministry and defense officials. Because government representatives participate in their private capacities, they are not bound by official positions, and, consequently, usually feel freer to push the envelope in seeking solutions to a variety of issues.¹¹⁶

The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) is a similar track two organization. NEACD, which is sponsored by the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC), a state-wide policy research institute of the University of California, is planning its eighth in a series of high-level, track two consultations between China, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and the United States. North Korea has participated in all aspects of planning, but has yet to send members to the actual meetings. The eighth round of discussions, planned for November 1998 in Moscow, will continue to reduce mistrust within the North Pacific region and to avert conflicts through confidence and security building measures.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶ Japan Economic Institute of America, “Japan Strives to Raise Profile on Regional Security,” JEI Report No. 8 (Vol. 1997), February 28, 1997, 3.

¹¹⁷ NEACD information obtained from Michael Stanciewicz, Coordinator for NEACD, at Naval Postgraduate School symposium, Monterey, CA, November 5, 1998.

ARF is considered a “track one” organization, but, until recently, has stayed out of the security arena and focused on issues primarily relating to economics, especially within Southeast Asia. But in recent years, ARF has gained the participation of Japan and Korea and is encouraging greater sharing of defense-related information and discussion of security issues among its members. For Japan to realize its potential as a regional leader, that country must continue to engage in activities aimed at building confidence and trust in Asia. Multilateral forums, such as ARF, NEACD, and CSCAP, certainly are appropriate venues for Tokyo to contribute constructively to the regional security debate.¹¹⁸ The U.S. must continue to encourage Japan to make these contributions.

Multilateralism in Asia, though, is not a panacea. Bilateral arrangements are deeply embedded in Asia and can not be tossed aside. Multilateral and bilateral arrangements can, and have been, complementary.

Both the Bush and Clinton administrations preferred to base the U.S. approach to multilateralism upon existing bilateral ties, thereby creating a two-tiered system. This meshed very well with Asian aspirations for new opportunities via multilateralism without risking the support of the bilateral ties.¹¹⁹

It remains to be said, that multilateralism, or even the two-tiered approach, will take time to develop, but must not be discarded for lack of efficacy. Even in Europe, which was much better suited for multilateral approaches, it took about twenty years for regional security groups to start producing real initiatives. These approaches must be given similar timeframes in Asia to take hold.

¹¹⁸ Japan Economic Institute of America, “Japan Strives to Raise Profile on Regional Security,” 10.

¹¹⁹ Olsen, “Multilateral Security Arrangements in Northeast Asia,” 65-66.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

The maintenance of the current force structure of U.S. troops in Asia is an attempt to freeze the Pacific in a Cold War framework. Although it is clear that a prosperous and open Asia Pacific is a key to the economic health of the U.S., the U.S. can still achieve its desired results in the region even with changes to their hard commitments there. The U.S. can achieve its national security objectives in the Asia Pacific region without such a massive forward-stationed military presence there. This policy suggests a rational restructuring to relieve various stresses on the existing structure, not American isolationism.

The missions of these forward-stationed troops in the Asia Pacific region have changed with the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, their roles were cut and dry: to combat communism. In the post-Cold War era, these troops remain in the region to battle uncertainty. Such a role does not warrant their existence in the region. The rationale for the presence has disappeared. The waning public opinion in both Japan and the U.S. for maintaining these troops in the region, the current Asian economic crisis, and the American desire to reduce defense expenditures also provide ample justification for restructuring the forward-stationed troops.

The best way to continue to satisfy American goals in the region and alleviate some of the pressures now stressing the system would be to remain engaged with a power projection strategy. This strategy would call for the continued stationing of U.S. naval forces in the region and the removal and relocation of the majority of American ground and air forces in the region to other U.S. territories in the Pacific. These relocated air and

ground troops could serve their same purpose from Hawaii or Guam and could be effectively tailored for deployment from these American bastions in the Pacific, while the naval forces would remain available in the region for rapid response to most contingencies. The U.S. should also consider measures to “Koreanize” the defense of Korea to accelerate the possible peaceful reunification on the peninsula. All of these restructuring initiatives should be taken with a continued emphasis on engagement with the countries of the region and their militaries and continued guaranteed access to the military facilities in the region if deemed necessary by the United States.

Such restructuring, though, would encounter several obstacles. It is how these obstacles are dealt with that could go a long way toward the maintenance of stability in the region. The removal of most of the U.S. troops from the region could cause a power struggle within the region, as the region’s existing powers and the region’s burgeoning powers would all be looking to stake their claims as the regional security leader or in support of such a leader. As a prosperous, capable, and conservative great power, Japan would normally be the primary stabilizer in the region and bear the costs and risks of doing so. It would also serve as the principal strategic counterweight to an increasingly assertive China.¹²⁰ Such a balancing within the region could lead to increased stability there. If harnessed properly by the U.S., this potential power vacuum could be filled with all-inclusive multilateral security groups, something the region has never had. The relocation of U.S. forces could serve as a centripetal force drawing the countries of the region closer together into regional security groups. The historical animosities between

certain countries of the region would and does act as an obstacle to such optimistic occurrences, but the U.S. should use its influence to get past such obstacles. Any signs of remorse by the Japanese for the atrocities its military committed in World War II would be perceived favorably by the other countries of the region. For, only if Japan forthrightly eschews its imperialist past can it even begin to conceive of playing a political leadership role in Asia free of the charge that it is seeking to reconstruct the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the euphemistic term the Japanese gave to describe their World War II occupation of other East Asian nations.¹²¹

A continued U.S. commitment to the Asia Pacific region is a reality of the unforeseeable future. All players benefit economically and strategically from the U.S. presence in the region. In the post-Cold War era though, this presence does not have to be in the form of forward-stationed troops on Asian countries' soil. The U.S. can satisfy the national security objectives it seeks by shifting to a power projection strategy with a forward-deployed naval force as the centerpiece.

¹²⁰ Carpenter, Ted Galen, "Smoke and Mirrors: The Clinton-Hashimoto Summit," CATO Foreign Policy Briefing No. 41, May 16, 1996.

¹²¹ Fukuyama, 47.

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